AZ 97 = GENERAL GEORGE PATTON = THE ARDENNES OFFENSIVE.
AZ 62 = BATTLE OF THE BULGE = GEORGE PATTON = WE WILL NOT FAIL.
Opinions vary, but certainly the reaction of some present that day was skepticism of yet another smug prediction by Patton that was quite out of place in this somber setting. Strong noted, "There was some laughter, especially from British officers, when Patton answered 'Forty-eight hours.'"25 Patton's aide, Lt. Col. Charles R. Codman, witnessed "a stir, a shuffling of feet, as those present straightened up in their chairs. In some faces skepticism. But through the room the current of excitement leaped like a flame." John Eisenhower wrote, "Witnesses to the occasion testify to the electric effect of this exchange. The prospect of relieving three divisions from the line, turning them north, and [moving them] over icy roads to Arlon to prepare for a major counterattack in less than seventy-two hours was astonishing, even to a group accustomed to flexibility in their military operations."
"It meant a 90-degree turn that would pose logistical nightmares—getting divisions on new roads and making sure supplies reached them from dumps established in quite a different context, for quite a different situation. Altogether it was an operation only a master could think of executing," notes Blumenson. Moreover, only a commander with exceptional confidence in his subordinate commanders and in the professional skill of his fighting divisions could dare risk such a venture. Patton not only never hesitated but embraced the opportunity to turn a potential military debacle into a triumph. [+]
AZ 90 = THE PATTON KNIGHT MOVE.
On 16 December 1944, the German Army launched an offensive in the Ardennes to split Allied forces and retake the ports of Antwerp and Liege. The German advance split the XII Army forces and left the 101st Airborne Division surrounded at Bastonge. To relieve the encircled units in the Ardennes and defeat the German offensive, Third Army conducted an impressive counterattack into the flank of the Germans. The flexibility to turn ninety degrees during the worst winter in thirty-eight years and relieve the encircled forces stands out as one of the greatest operational maneuvers in history. While this operation is unique, the actions of the commander and staff that planned and executed it deserve closer analysis to determine what enabled them to orchestrate this maneuver. It is especially remarkable, when taken in context, how rapidly the Army changed during the previous four years. The U.S. Army anticipating eventual war in Europe began a transformation which included drastic changes in force structure and doctrine. The primary transformation in doctrine was the revision of Field Service Regulation 100-5. The 1941 edition of 100-5 superseded a tentative version published in 1939 which was the first major revision of warfighting doctrine since 1923. It was with this manual that the Army went to war. It was also the manual used to train and teach new and reserve officers who had little experience in the study and practice of war. How important and to what extent did Patton's Third Army apply the doctrine in conducting the Battle of the Bulge? Particularly relevant to serving officers today is to analyze the operations of Third Army in terms of doctrine that existed in 1944 and today's current doctrine. An examination of similarities and differences between the doctrines may allow development of possible conclusions on the ability of future forces to conduct decisive maneuver in compressed time and space. This monograph sought to answer the question does current operational doctrine place enough emphasis on the art of command to ensure flexibility in the execution of operational warfare? The findings of this monograph suggests that the Army should consider refining the emphasis placed on the art of command in the current doctrinal manuals FMs 100-5 and 101-5. Additionally, more doctrinal emphasis should be placed on fulfilling commander's information needs. More controversial would be to allow increased latitude by commanders in selection of their staff officers. While some will argue this is cronyism, it exist at some levels in certain sub-communities of the Army already. If commanders could pick subordinates that are familiar with and understand how the commander thinks this has the potential to increase the effectiveness of unit operations. [+]
AZ 94 = CRITICAL REALIGNMENT (AZ-206 AN ABRUPT COALITIONAL CHANGE AMONG THE MASS-BASED ELECTORATE) = CRITICAL RACE THEORY.
AZ 80 = PRIVATIZED LOOP = SECULAR REALIGNMENT = SPANISH CONJUGATION (AZ-33 CONJUGATE).
AZ 118 = IMAGINARY PART OF A COMPLEX (AZ-33 CONJUGATE) = PERSONAL MEDICAL CONFERENCE = PRIVATE MEDICAL CONFERENCE.
AZ 171 = AIR-TO-GROUND 2 IS PRIVATIZED FOR PMC = GOVERNING PROGRAM MANAGEMENT COUNCIL (The highest-level PMC that regularly reviews the program or project. The determination of whether a cognizant Center’s PMC, an Enterprise’s PMC, or NASA’s agency-wide PMC is “governing” for a specific program or project is made by the NASA agency-wide PMC; AZ-14 PMC, AZ-21 GPMC).
AZ 21 = GPMC = R-BAR.
AZ 109 = ROTATIONAL PITCH MANEUVER (AZ-21 R-BAR) = LEGENDRE TRANSFORMATION (AZ-33 CONJUGATE, AZ-62 CONVEX CONJUGATE) = WHAT'S A REALIGNMENT LOOK LIKE?.
AZ 122 = NASA PROGRAM MANAGEMENT COUNCIL.