AQ 934 = THE SECOND STRUCTURAL FLAW OF U.S. MILITARY CULTURE (The second structural flaw is a Huntingtonian doctrine of civil-military relations ideally suited for the Cold War but which, given its outdated conception of “professionalism,” has outlived its usefulness and is today a major impediment to the necessary constant dialogue between the military and civilians) = ONE MUST HAVE AN ORGASM FROM WHICH ONE NEVER RETURNS (Derangement of the senses, M Satai).
google :: Huntingtonian doctrine of civil-military intercourse
Panel 6: Latin American Literature: Analyses and Debate
Session Two: “Dark Side of Latin America”
6) Sex and Drugs and Rock n Roll: Subalternity and Language in the Works of Mexican
Victoria Carpenter, University of Derby (UK)
This paper is a part of an ongoing research project focussed upon the relationship between La Onda and the rock culture of the 1960s. The analysis of the representation of sexual intercourse concentrates on the link between the characters’ sexual prowess and the subaltern nature of La Onda discourse, consequently addressing the juxtapositions of traditional and nonconformist attitudes to sexual relationships. The texts examined in this study are the novel La Tumba
(1964) and the short story ‘¿Cuál es la onda?’
(1968) by José Agustín, and the novel Gazapo
(1965) by Gustavo Sainz. Of particular interest is the intertextual analysis of the depictions of intercourse insofar as the use of taboo and euphemistical imagery. [+]
From Revolutions to Total War
In the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, there was a growing recognition of the increased complexity of strategy, summarized in Karl von Clausewitz’s warning that “there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it.” At the tactical level, the Prussian philosopher wrote, “the means are fighting forces trained for combat; the end is victory.” For the strategic, however, Clausewitz concluded that military victories were meaningless unless they were the means to obtain a political end, “those objects which lead directly to peace.”
Thus, strategy was “the linking together (Verbindung) of separate battle engagements into a single whole, for the final object of the war.” And only the political or policy level could determine that objective. “To bring a war, or any one of its campaigns to a successful close requires a thorough grasp of national policy,” he pointed out. “On that level, strategy and policy coalesce.” For Clausewitz, this vertical continuum (see Figure 1) was best exemplified by Frederick the Great, who embodied both policy and strategy and whose Silesian conquests of 1741 lie considered to be the classic example of strategic art by demonstrating “an element of restrained strength, . . . ready to adjust to the smallest shift in the political situation.”
Figure 1. The Policy Continuum.
With his deceptively simple description of the vertical continuum of war, Clausewitz set the stage for the equivalent of a Copernican shift in the strategic ends-ways-means paradigm. Now that paradigm was more complex, operating on both the military and policy levels with the totality of the ends, ways, and means at the lower levels interconnected with the political application at the policy level of those same strategic elements. This connection was the essence of Clausewitz’s description of war as a continuation of political intercourse (Verkehr) with the addition of other means. He explained that:
We deliberately use the phrase “with the addition of other means” because we also want to make it clear ‘ that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. . . . The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace. . . . War cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.
The Industrial and French Revolutions
This growing complexity in dealing with the strategic paradigm was compounded by two upheavals. Clausewitz was profoundly aware of one, the French Revolution; he was totally ignorant of the other, the industrial/technological revolution. Prior to the French Revolution, 18th century rulers had acquired such effective political and economic control over their people that they were able to create their war machines as separate and distinct from the rest of society. The Revolution changed all that with the appearance of a force “that beggared all imagination” as Clausewitz described it,
Suddenly, war again became the business of the people-a people of thirty millions, all of whom considered themselves to be citizens. There seemed no end to the resources mobilized; all limits disappeared in the vigor and enthusiasm shown by governments and their subjects.... War, untrammelled by any, conventional restraints, had broken loose in all its elemental fury. This was due to the peoples’ new share in these great affairs of state; and their participation, in its turn, resulted partly from the impact that the Revolution had on the internal conditions of every state and partly from the danger that France posed to everyone.
For Clausewitz, the people greatly complicated the formulation and implementation of strategy by adding “primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force” to form with the army and the government what he termed the remarkable trinity (see Figure 2: [GOVERNMENT (triangle top), MILITARY (left), PEOPLE (right)]). The army he saw as a “creative spirit,” roaming freely within “the play of chance and probability,” but always bound to the government, the third element, in “subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.
It was the complex totality of this trinity that, Clausewitz realized, had altered and complicated strategy so completely.
Clearly the tremendous effects of the French Revolution . . . were caused not so much by new military methods and concepts as by radical changes in policies and administration, by the new character of government, altered conditions of the French people, and the like. . . . It follows that the transformation of the art of war resulted from the transformation of politics.
But while that transformation had made it absolutely essential to consider the elements of the Clausewitzian trinity within the strategic paradigm, the variations possible in the interplay of those elements moved strategy even farther from the realm of scientific certitude. “A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them,” Clausewitz warned in this regard, “would conflict with reality to such an extent that, for this reason alone, it would be totally useless.”
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technological transformation "fundamentally altered the interplay of elements within the Clausewitzian trinity, further complicating the formulation and application process within the strategic paradigm".
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By far the best chapter is Jablonsky's masterful examination, "Why Is Strategy Difficult? —Choice
AQ 414 = THE REMARKABLE TRINITY = CONGRESSUS CUM DAEMONE = EMPIRICAL DESTRUCTION = NUMBER SYMBOL SWARMS = POPULAR UNCONSCIOUS = THE HYSTERICAL SUBLIME = THE SPIDER AND THE TULIP = THEORY OF THE PARTISAN = THINKING OUT OF THE BOX = WEAPON OF CONCUPISCENCE.
AQ 569 = GOTHIC FICTION AND THE GROTESQUE = A DIFFICULT MATHEMATICAL EQUATION = CATCHER IN THE RYE WITH A STRAP-ON (Michael Turner describing his book "The Pornographer's Poem") = PREVENTIVE MILITARY STRIKES = THE TACTICAL TERRAIN OF STRUGGLE.
AQ 540 = LETTERS FROM NORTHANGER ABBEY = STRATEGY FOR STRATEGY'S SAKE (AQ-470 CLAUSEWITZ IN WONDERLAND).
AQ 591 = BAD JOKES AND OTHER DELETED NONSENSE (We need a page where bad jokes and other deleted nonsense can rest in peace. So, here it is!; see: AQ-100) = ATLANTIS-LEMURIAN MAGICK WORKING = DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOUND AND HEARING = HYPOTHETICAL FLOWERING HORMONE = TECNERDICKALLY ENHANCED WEIRDNESS (Piet).
Dear Miss Morland,
And from these circumstances, you infer perhaps the probability of some negligence—some—or it may be—of something still less pardonable.
If I understand you rightly, you had formed a surmise of such horror as I have hardly words to—, consider the dreadful nature of the suspicions you have entertained. What have you been judging from? Remember the country and the age in which we live. Remember that we are English, that we are Christians. Consult your own understanding, your own sense of the probable, your own observation of what is passing around you—Does our education prepare us for such atrocities? Do our laws connive at them? Could they be perpetrated without being known, in a country like this, where social and literary intercourse is on such a footing; where every man is surrounded by a neighbourhood of voluntary spies, and where roads and newspapers lay every thing open? What ideas have you been admitting?
Henry Tilney, Northanger Abbey, Gloucestershire, England
AQ 1007 = HUNTINGTONIAN DOCTRINE OF CIVIL-MILITARY INTERCOURSE = JUST YESTERDAY MORNING THEY LET ME KNOW YOU WERE GONE (Fire and Rain, James Taylor) = AND THUS IS THE CROWN DEFENDED BY THESE THREE THUNDERBOLTS (MAZ, The Cry of the 6th Æthyr).
AQ 198 = FIRE AND RAIN (James Taylor) = METROPHAGE (Cyber-Punk: The Final Solution, Mark Downham) [+][+] = CHESHIRECAT (Asteroid #6042)= DARK SALMON = EXPANSION = FREIKORPS = FITZGERALD (Asteroid #3665) = GERONTION = MORS CROCCA = ONE HUNDRED = STEREO MCS = VERMILION.
AQ 418 = TO PUT IT IN A NUTSHELL (AQ-470 CLAUSEWITZ IN WONDERLAND) = WICHITA VORTEX SUTRA (Allen Ginsberg; PDF) [+] = EQUIDISTANCE PRINCIPLE (Iran's method to define its maritime boundaries; see AQ-283, 311, 447, 637, 1197, 1237, 1527, 2906) = EXHIBITION OF FRENCH ART = MAGICAL TANGENT OF "MEANING" = MULTIROBOT SYSTEMS = MYSTERIUM TREMENDUM = SIGN OF AUTHORIZATION (Abuldiz) = STRUCTURAL TRIGGERS = THE DAVE BRUBECK QUARTET = THE TWO INSCRIPTIONS (Anti-Œdipus) = WHO DOES THE GRAIL SERVE?